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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
We have the rare situation where not even our heavy 
degree of deference to arbitrators can save an arbitration 
decision and award.  Monongahela Valley Hospital, Inc. 
sought to vacate an arbitration decision and award in favor of 
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International 
Union, AFL-CIO, CLC.  The District Court granted the 
Hospital’s motion for summary judgment and vacated the 
award.  The Union now appeals, arguing that the District Court 
erred by exceeding its very limited scope of review and should 
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have confirmed the award because it rationally derived from 
the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”).  We 
agree with our District Court colleague, and thus we will 
affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
The Hospital has approximately 1,100 employees, just 
under half of whom are in a bargaining unit represented by the 
Union.  Working supervisors are not included in the bargaining 
unit.  The CBA, in effect from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2017 
(thus at all times relevant to this dispute), governed the 
relationship between the Hospital and the bargaining unit 
employees.  It included a dispute resolution process whereby 
an aggrieved employee could submit a grievance that if 
unresolved through the grievance procedure, could be appealed 
to arbitration.   
Under § 8(F)(3) of the CBA, an arbitrator’s authority is 
limited “only to interpret[ing], apply[ing] or determin[ing] 
compliance with [its] provisions.”  The arbitrator specifically 
lacks the “authority to add to, detract from or alter in any way 
the provisions of this [CBA].”  Id. 
The CBA provision before us—§ 13(B)(6)—concerns 
the scheduling of vacation.  It provides that  
[v]acation will, so far as possible, 
be granted at times most desired by 
employees; but the final right to 
allow vacation periods, and the 
right to change vacation periods[,] 
is exclusively reserved to the 
Hospital.  Any changes in vacation 
schedules may be realized by 
mutual consent.  In the event the 
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Hospital unilaterally changes a 
schedule causing the employee to 
suffer financial loss, the Hospital 
agrees to reimburse the employee 
for provable loss.   
(Emphases added.)  
 Conflicts over vacation scheduling occurred only when 
there was a limited number of bargaining and non-bargaining 
unit employees that performed the same or similar functions 
such that only one employee could be away at a time.  There 
were only three instances in the record before late 2016 when 
a bargaining unit employee did not receive her desired vacation 
because a supervisor (not a bargaining unit member) chose the 
same days (and in one of those instances the issue went away).     
 To avoid vacation scheduling conflicts, the Hospital, in 
apparent agreement with the Union, experimented with using 
“blackout” periods for scheduling 2017 vacation whereby 
certain weeks were blocked off for vacation.  The Hospital, 
however, found that the experiment was unsuccessful in 
eliminating scheduling conflicts and discontinued it after that 
year.   
 Our case stems from a dispute over vacation days 
between bargaining unit employee Carol Konsugar and her 
working supervisor, a non-bargaining unit employee.  At the 
end of 2016, Ms. Konsugar requested vacation for the 
following year during the week of December 25, 2017.  The 
Hospital denied her request because her working supervisor 
had requested that same week off and both could not be away 
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at the same time.1  Ms. Konsugar then filed a grievance in 
January 2017 alleging the denial of her requested vacation as a 
CBA violation, and arbitration ensued.2   
 The parties selected Gerald Kobell as the arbitrator.  The 
Union argued before him that § 13(B)(6) of the CBA gave its 
employees preference when there were conflicting vacation 
requests, while the Hospital contended the “final” and 
“exclusive” language in that section conferred on it ultimate 
discretion over vacation scheduling.  In an attempt to reconcile 
the competing positions, the arbitrator framed the issue as 
“whether the Hospital violated the [CBA] when it denied 
                                              
1 The record is not clear whether Ms. Konsugar’s requested 
week of December 25, 2017, was “blacked out.”  The 
arbitrator, based on Union Exhibits 5 and 6, stated only that the 
week of December 18, 2016, was blacked out.  It appears the 
“2016” was a scrivener’s error considering that the arbitrator 
later refers to those same exhibits as blacking out vacation for 
2017, see App. 46; 48.  In any event, the Hospital represented 
at oral argument, and the Union did not dispute, that Ms. 
Konsugar was unaffected by the “blackout” policy, See Trans. 
of Oral Arg. at 18–19, 23–24.  We therefore proceed on the 
assumption that Ms. Konsugar’s request for vacation during 
the week of December 25, 2017, did not involve a “blackout 
period.”  To the extent the arbitrator ruled that the Hospital may 
no longer use “blackout” periods, we need not weigh in on this 
point. 
 
2 The grievance referenced specifically only Ms. Konsugar’s 
violation.  Two other disputes over vacation scheduling 
allegedly arose during 2017, yet they were not squarely before 
the arbitrator, and we do not address them here.  
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employee Carol Konsugar the vacation she desired [for 2017] 
in December 2016.”   
In interpreting § 13(B)(6), the arbitrator stated he could 
not “conclude that the subsequent reservation of exclusivity in 
allocating vacations entirely to the Hospital completely 
negates . . . ‘so far as possible’” because of his concern that it 
could then always deny bargaining unit employees their 
vacation requests.  Accordingly, the arbitrator sustained the 
grievance, ruling that, “notwithstanding the Hospital’s 
reservation of exclusive rights contained in Section 13[B](6) 
of the Agreement,” the CBA precluded the Hospital from using 
“blackout” periods and prevented it from “deny[ing] senior 
employees in the bargaining unit their desired vacation[] when 
there is no operating need.”     
 The Hospital filed a complaint with the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185, seeking to vacate the award on the grounds that “[t]he 
arbitrator’s decision and award exceeded his authority, ignored 
the plain language of the CBA, and . . . failed to draw its 
essence from the language of the CBA.”  Both parties moved 
for summary judgment.  The District Court, after 
acknowledging that it owed a “heavy degree of deference to 
the arbitrator,” ruled nonetheless that the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of § 13(B)(6) “(1) was a manifest disregard of 
the plain language of the CBA[,] (2) ignored the clear 
intentions of the parties[,] and (3) failed to construe such 
provision to give effect to all parts of the provision.”  
Accordingly, it granted the Hospital’s motion for summary 
judgment and vacated the arbitration award.  The Union 
appeals to us.      
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II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment and apply the same standard 
as that Court in reviewing an arbitration award.  Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 
(3d Cir. 1996).  No doubt courts are restricted in reviewing the 
decision of an arbitrator resolving a labor dispute under a 
collective bargaining agreement, as “[t]he sine qua non of 
judicial review of an arbitration award is a heavy degree of 
deference to the arbitrator.”  Akers Nat’l Roll Co. v. United 
Steel, 712 F.3d 155, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2013).   
But that deference is not unlimited.  If it were, court 
review would be an oxymoron.  Hence we will not “rubber 
stamp” an arbitrator’s decision.  Hamilton Park Health Care 
Ctr. Ltd. v. 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers E., 817 
F.3d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Matteson v. Ryder Sys. 
Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Rather, we will vacate 
an award “if it is entirely unsupported by the record or if it 
reflects a manifest disregard of the agreement.”  Citgo Asphalt 
Ref. Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int'l 
Union Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted).  The Supreme Court has long made clear 
that an award must still “draw[] its essence” from the words of 
the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator may not 
“dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”  United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).  Further, an arbitrator must act within the 
scope of authority conferred him by the CBA.  See Pa. Power 
Co. v. Local Union No. 272 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
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276 F.3d 174, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating an award where 
arbitrator “exceeded his powers” under the CBA).     
III. DISCUSSION  
The Union asks us to reverse the District Court’s order 
and reinstate the arbitration award.  We decline to do so 
because the award in no rational way draws its essence from 
the CBA, and the arbitrator, in inserting the “operating need” 
restriction, exceeded his authority under the CBA by 
dispensing his own brand of industrial justice.  
A. The award ignores the CBA’s plain language.   
We begin with the obvious: an arbitrator “may not 
ignore the plain language of the contract.”  United 
Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 
29, 38 (1987).  Here § 13(B)(6) gives the Hospital the “final” 
and “exclusive[]” right to deny employees their desired 
vacation.  That it has the authority “unilaterally” to change a 
vacation schedule, even though schedules may also be changed 
by “mutual consent,” lends further support to this clear 
reservation of rights.  These terms “are simply not susceptible 
to more than one reasonable interpretation, and they do not 
somehow render the CBA[] incomplete or ambiguous.”  
U.A.W. Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Company, 188 F.3d 
130, 146 (3d Cir. 1999).   
The arbitrator ignored this plain language, and he ruled 
against the Hospital when it “elected to rely upon its 
reservation of rights” in § 13(B)(6) in denying Ms. Konsugar 
her requested vacation.  He justified his decision by reasoning 
that the “so far as possible” language must be given some 
meaning lest the rights of the bargaining unit employees with 
respect to vacations “could always be negated.”  
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“So far as possible” cannot hold hostage what follows 
here.  It is a subordinate phrase clearly qualified by the 
superseding “but,” and what follows grants the Hospital the 
“final,” “exclusive[]” and “unilateral[]” right to schedule 
vacations.  “It is . . . well established that contract language 
must be read in context and that ‘a subsequent specification 
impliedly limits the meaning of a preceding generalization.’”  
Affiliated Food Distribs., Inc. v. Local Union No. 229, 483 F.2d 
418, 420 (3d Cir. 1973) (citation omitted).  Put in context, “so 
far as possible” means the Hospital should consider in good 
faith the bargaining unit employees’ preferences when 
exercising its final and exclusive right to determine vacation, 
but nothing more; and there is certainly no requirement 
anywhere in the CBA that the Hospital consider operating 
need.   
Thus the Hospital could rely on its reservation of rights 
to deny a vacation request.  Supporting this is that the Union 
failed to introduce evidence that the Hospital did not “so far as 
possible” attempt to honor Ms. Konsugar’s request.  Indeed, in 
reciting the Hospital’s position, the arbitrator stated that Ms. 
Konsugar was granted her first three requested vacation dates, 
and the Union failed to rebut that evidence.     
Even this is not all that went off the rails.  The arbitrator 
concluded that if a claim to vacation, absent operating need or 
special circumstances, cannot be resolved, the bargaining unit 
member’s claim prevails.  Rather than acknowledge the CBA’s 
rule that the Hospital makes the ultimate determination over 
vacation scheduling, this decision flips the CBA on its head 
and grants the Union a near-categorical preference.  
Accordingly, notwithstanding a standard of review tilted much 
in favor of arbitrators, we cannot affirm this award that 
manifestly disregards the plain language of the CBA.  
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B. The arbitrator exceeded the scope of his 
delegated authority when he injected the “operating 
need” restriction into the CBA.  
Manifestly disregarding the Hospital’s “final,” 
“exclusive[]” and “unilateral[]” right to schedule vacations, the 
arbitrator deviated far beyond the scope of his authority by 
force-feeding the “operating need” requirement into the CBA.  
To repeat, an arbitrator’s authority sources from the 
CBA itself.  Here § 8(F)(3) makes clear that the arbitrator has 
no authority to “add to, detract from or alter in any way the 
provisions of [the CBA].”  Yet that is what the arbitrator did in 
inserting the “operating need” restriction.  It appears nowhere 
in the CBA.  Instead, the arbitrator urges what he believes 
“should occur in the situation where a bargaining unit 
employee and his/her working supervisor . . . both desire the 
identical vacation;” the employee should prevail and “the 
working supervisor should not have a superior claim to the 
desired vacation week.”  (Emphases added.)  Thus, he 
concludes, “the Hospital may not reserve unto itself and the 
working supervisor the right to deny senior employees in the 
bargaining unit their desired vacation, when there is no 
operating need for the employee to be present during the 
desired vacation week because of skills, ability, and 
responsibilities that cannot also be performed by the working 
supervisor.”  None of these policy pronouncements, however, 
can be found in the text of the CBA.   
Why “operating need” is absent stems from the parties’ 
bargaining history.  The 1974 CBA provided that “each 
employee’s vacation period shall be designated by the Hospital 
to meet the requirement of operating conditions” (emphasis 
added), in effect the “operating need” restriction the arbitrator 
added here.  In 1977, however, the CBA was modified to 
eliminate the operating-conditions restriction and to give the 
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final say to the Hospital to schedule vacations.  That is the same 
language that is in the CBA governing this dispute.  Moreover, 
in 2009 the Union sought a specific restriction to the CBA that 
“[n]on-bargaining unit employees will not be given vacation 
scheduling preference over bargaining unit employees,” but 
that amendment was rejected and never became a part of the 
agreement.  App. 99, 43.   
Thus past becomes prologue in discovering the parties’ 
intent.  Where an arbitrator injects a restriction into a contract 
to which the Hospital did not agree and to which the bargaining 
unit employees are not entitled, he dispenses his own brand of 
industrial justice and should be overturned.  See Brentwood 
Medical Ass’n v. United Mine Workers, 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (noting that “it is within our discretion to vacate [an 
arbitration] award” when it is supported only by language the 
arbitrator injected into the CBA); Poland Spring Corp. v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 1445, 
314 F.3d 29, 34–37 (1st Cir. 2002) (voiding an arbitration 
award for limiting a company’s termination powers with a 
made-up term: “mitigating circumstances”).  
*    *    *    *    * 
An arbitration award does not “draw[] its essence” from 
a CBA where, as here, an arbitrator not only fails to heed the 
plain language of the agreement but also exceeds his authority 
by injecting language into it that was already rejected in prior 
bargaining.  The bar may be low to uphold an arbitration 
award, but it still exists.  As we are not an amen corner for 
arbitrators’ rulings, we affirm the well-reasoned decision of the 
District Court vacating the arbitrator’s decision and award.   
 
